In the 1990s, European merger regulation (EMR) was biased against foreign acquirers, especially if the deal harmed domestic rivals (i.e., protectionism). In 2002, the Court of First Instance overturned three prohibitions by the European Commission (EC) and criticized its economic analysis. These events hastened EMR reform, including amendments introduced in May 2004. With a sample of 474 merger proposals submitted to the EC during 1990-2007, we show that the EC's protectionism from the 1990s did not extend into more recent periods. The change of policy toward foreign acquirers seems rooted in Court judgments of 2002 and subsequent regulatory reforms.
I. Introduction
The mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market is a major resource allocation channel in modern economies. Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (forthcoming) report that between 1992 and 2009, U.S. acquirers completed more than 128,000 transactions, with an aggregate deal value of $16,703 billion and a 1998 peak value of $1,806 billion-or 13% of U.S. stock market capitalization. Similarly impressive figures emerge from European contexts: Between 1992 and 2009, more than 50,000 deals were completed by European acquirers for an aggregate deal value of $10,715 billion.
The supervision of the M&A market by public authorities thus represents a central concern. In the United States, current regulations are rooted in the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act, which aimed to promote competition by opposing business combinations that seemed likely to lead to monopolies or cartels. A century later, European merger 1 regulations (Council Regulation No. 4064/1989 ) pursued similar consumer protection goals by enforcing competition. However, the academic literature, pioneered by Eckbo (1983) , found little support for the reasoning behind these regulations, because the regulated takeovers seemingly would have not led to increased monopoly power in the absence of the regulation. So why do government authorities regulate the M&A market? Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000) offer several explanations, such as bureaucratic self-interest, political extraction, or private benefits. Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) focus on a potential private benefit from M&A market regulation, namely, using merger regulation as a tool to shelter domestic firms from international competition (i.e., the protectionism hypothesis). In this study, we expand on their work to test whether the latest shifts in European merger regulations (EMR) have affected European authorities' behavior.
The protectionist tendencies of the European Commission (EC) appeared most prominently in two widely publicized decisions. First, in response to the proposed Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger in 1997, the EC required Boeing to abandon important exclusive supply contracts unrelated to the merger, which the company had signed with its main U.S. customers. Observers in the United States (including members of the U.S. Congress) claimed the EC was not considering the impact of the merger on consumer welfare but rather was just acting to protect Airbus Industries-Boeing's European rival (see Roberto (1998) ; Aktas et al. (2001) ). Second, the EC blocked a proposed merger between General Electric and Honeywell in 2001. These two U.S. companies obtained approval to merge from all U.S. regulatory agencies, and the refusal by the EC prompted widespread criticisms in the U.S. business press (see Priest and Romani (2001) ).
The EC's decisions also attracted the attention of the academic community. To investigate the true motives of its decisions, previous research has used stock price reactions surrounding the EC interventions and revealed that protectionism could be an important determinant of EMR. Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2004) uncover a troubling trait among European regulators: Investors anticipate far higher costs to the merging parties when the EC intervenes against foreign acquirers as opposed to acquirers from European countries. Such evidence raises doubts about the true intentions of European regulators. In a subsequent study, the same authors provided a more direct test of the protectionism hypothesis. Using a sample of 290 merger proposals submitted to the EC during 1990-2000, Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) report that the probability of EC intervention against foreign bidders increases when European rivals suffer from the merger announcement. In other words, the more the announcement prompts negative abnormal returns for European rivals, the more negative is the EC's attitude toward foreign acquirers. These results are particularly striking because negative abnormal returns for rival firms actually are incompatible with increased monopoly power at the industry level (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) ). That is, negative returns for rival firms suggest that the proposed mergers likely would increase competition in the industry.
Other studies devoted to the analysis of merger proposals prior to 2002 also have considered acquirer nationality as a possible determinant of EMR (e.g., Neven and Röller (2002) ; Bergman, Jakobsson, and Razo (2005) , Duso, Gugler, and Szücs (2010) ; and Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (forthcoming) ). However, these studies do not provide clear-cut empirical tests of the protectionism hypothesis. In particular, unlike Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) , these studies do not account simultaneously for the wealth effects for European rivals and acquirer nationality as a combined determinant of EC intervention. 2 Then 2002 marked an important milestone: The EC faced an important challenge when the European Court of First Instance overruled three EC decisions, 3 arguing that the EC had misevaluated the competitive intensity in relevant industries. Following these remarkable decisions, the EC reformed the EMR in early 2004 (Council Regulation 139/2004) . Although the official origin of the reform was a European Union Green Paper 4 published in 2001, the European Court of First Instance's decisions certainly contributed to reform adoption. In particular, the 2004 reform aimed to improve economic analyses of submitted cases (Lyons (2009) To answer this question, we rely on a sample of merger proposals submitted to the EC during 1990-2007. We start with the sample of 290 observations used by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) , which covers the period 1990-2000. Then we augment this sample by hand 2 The key aspect of the Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) method is the use of an interaction variable between acquirer nationality and abnormal returns to European rivals as a determinant of the probability of EC intervention. 3 The three EC decisions prohibited the following merger proposals: Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand, and Tetra Laval/Sidel. 4 collecting all cases submitted to the EC between 2001 and 2007. During this latter period, 2,145 merger proposals were submitted. Our analyses are based on event studies, so to be included in the sample, the firms (targets, acquirers, and rivals) must be listed on a stock exchange. We replicate the approach developed by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) and therefore collect the needed information from the Thomson One Banker, Datastream, and CRSP databases. To form rival portfolios, we use the Thomson One Banker Comparables database. The multivariate analyses refer to a final sample that encompasses 474 merger proposals, of which 290 transactions are from 1990-2000, and 184 are from 2001-2007. With this innovative, unique data set, we derive several main results:
1. The sample merger proposals, on average, create value for shareholders. Consistent with prior literature, target shareholders mainly capture this value creation effect, and acquirers break even on average. The average wealth effect for industry rivals at the announcement of the merger proposal is negative and marginally significant, a result inconsistent with the market power hypothesis, which predicts a positive announcement effect for industry rivals. Taken together, the evidence from investor reactions indicates that our sample deals are value creating and pro-competitive, and therefore beneficial for consumers.
2. The wealth effect of the announcement at the deal level (acquirers plus targets) increases with the severity of the EC's scrutiny. Challenged merger proposals are more value creating at the initial announcement than deals approved outright. This result would be consistent with regulators' stated anti-monopoly objective, if the source of the value creation were an increase in industry monopoly rents. However, the value creation source also could relate to synergy or efficiency gains.
3. The multivariate analysis reveals that during 2001-2007, the joint effect of acquirer nationality and European rival abnormal returns was no longer a significant determinant of the probability of EC intervention. That is, in the latter study period, EC regulators were less biased against foreign acquirers, and the influence of acquirer nationality on the probability of EC intervention did not relate to stock price reactions for European rivals.
This result contrasts with Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll's (2007) findings for the 1990s. Our results further suggest that the EC has changed its behavior toward foreign acquirers over time. The lack of protectionism in the more recent period and the statistical significance of some important variables, such as deal size, deal value creation, and acquirer size, lead us to conclude that the economic soundness of the EC decisions has improved over time. This article depends on and complements previous research that has used stock price data to infer actual rather than intended motives of merger regulations. Schwert (1981) was among the first authors to suggest that it would be possible to assess the effects of government regulations from the behavior of stock prices. Eckbo (1983) explicitly tested whether U.S. regulatory authorities (e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Department of Justice) intervene to regulate business combinations that likely reinforce monopoly rents within an industry (i.e., market power hypothesis). However, Eckbo failed to support the market power hypothesis, and subsequent contributions delivered mostly the same message (e.g., ; Eckbo and Wier (1985) ; Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1991); Eckbo (1992) ; Fee and Thomas (2004) ; Shahrur (2005)), with the exception of Bernile and Lyandres (2010) , who controlled for expected merger synergies when testing for this hypothesis.
Our work also relates to literature focused on the political economy and the effectiveness of the EMR. Bergman, Jakobsson, and Razo (2005) analyzed the determinants of EC interventions using a sample of 96 merger proposals prior to 2002 and identified the market shares of the parties, increased market shares following the merger, and the existence of entry barriers as the most significant determinants. Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007) which in the period after the reform seemed related more to remedies of past decisions imposed by the EC than to prohibitions. In comparison with Duso, Gugler, and Szücs's (2010) article, our analysis focuses more specifically on the protectionism hypothesis. Accordingly, we organize this article as follows: Section II briefly presents the EMR procedures, the criticisms of the EC, and the main features of the 2004 reform. In Section III we describe the sample and data. After presenting the results in Section IV, we offer some additional robustness checks and outcomes in Section V, and then conclude in Section VI.
II. The European merger regulation
The European merger regulation (EMR) targets M&A activities of large firms with operating activities in Europe. Between September 1990 and June 2011, the EC received more than 4,700 merger proposals. 5 Around 90% of these proposals were allowed without any conditions or charges imposed; the EC regulatory actions directly affected only 7.5% of merger proposals. Specifically, the EC imposed remedies on 7% of the proposed merger proposals and prohibited fewer than 0.5% of the cases. Although these prohibited cases attracted significant media coverage, only 21 business combinations actually have been prohibited in 20 years. However, indirect effects of the regulation might be much more important, such that its very existence could deter some of the most anticompetitive mergers (see Eckbo (1992) ; Duso, Gugler, and Szücs (2010) ). With this section, we detail the legal context of the EMR prior to 2004, and then present the most important features of the 2004 reform.
II.A. Legal context prior to 2004
The EMR rules are governed by a set of regulations, the first of which came into effect in 1990 (Council Regulation 4064/89). These rules complement general antitrust rules set out in Articles 101 (cartels) and 102 (abuse of dominance) in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. They allow the EC to control business combinations (mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures) of significant size that involve firms operating in Europe. If the parties meet certain worldwide and European gross sales thresholds, they must notify the EC of the deal (Article 1.2 of Council Regulation 134/2004). According to the EC, the mission of the EMR -is to enforce the competition rules of the Community Treaties, in order to ensure that competition in the EU market is not distorted and that markets operate as efficiently as possible, thereby contributing to the welfare of consumers and to the competitiveness of the European economy.‖ 6
The procedure followed by the EC since 1990 thus is precisely defined. First, following a notification of a merger proposal, the EC has 25 working days to complete its preliminary analysis, called Phase I. The decision at this stage mainly relies on information contained in the notification. The EC may issue three types of decisions: accept the deal outright, accept the deal subject to specific remedies imposed on the parties (e.g., divestitures of certain assets), or send any deal that raises serious competition issue through an in-depth investigation, called Phase II. The EC then has 90 days to announce a Phase II decision, whether authorization, authorization subject to conditions, or prohibition of the proposed merger. Furthermore, all information about the notifications, together with the corresponding decisions, is published and publicly downloadable from the EC's website. 7
Following the EC rulings, the parties can appeal to the Court of First Instance or the European Court of Justice. Such actions are relatively rare; the appeal procedures are long, and delays often harm the involved companies. As of 2001 though, an -expedited procedure‖ introduced for merger appeals in the Court of First Instance requires decisions within a 12month period. However, this procedure cannot be applied in all cases (see Lyons (2009) ). 8
II.B. 2004 reforms of the European merger regulation
Two main criticisms arose from professionals and academics about the European procedures in place before 2002. First, a unique team was in charge of each case, from the start of Phase I to the end of Phase II. In a way, this team therefore played investigator, prosecutor, and jury.
For example, the team in charge of a given case likely would spend the time allowed for the Phase II procedure to justify its Phase I decision, rather than starting with unbiased, new investigations (Lyons (2009) ). The business press highlighted this potential bias in the Honeywell-General Electric case, noting the contrast with the U.S. authorities, who must obtain court approval to block a merger (Financial Times (2001) .
Second, a dominance test, which specifies the conditions under which the EC had to intervene, also was subject to questions. Article 2(3) of Council Regulation No 4064/89 specifies: -A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common market.‖ This dominance test encouraged a formalistic approach that granted too much weight to market shares (Lyons (2009) ). Unlike the more pragmatic U.S. procedure, the European dominance test did not allow for efficiency arguments. 9 Thus the international business press repeatedly accused the EC of protectionist behaviors in major cases, including Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and General Electric/Honeywell.
Then the Court of First Instance annulled three prohibition decisions in 2002:
Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand, and Tetra Laval/Sidel. The Court stressed the weaknesses of the economic analysis performed by the EC experts, arguing that the potential anticompetitive effects in those cases were not clearly motivated. According to Lyons (2009) , these decisions hastened the reform of the EMR, which had begun in 1999. In particular, the  An extended EC timetable, such that if the merging parties want to propose remedies to make the combination compatible with competitive goals, the Phase II investigations can last 105 working days instead of 90.
 Creation of a Chief Competition Economist position, together with a team of about 10 economists, assigned to support case teams with more sophisticated economic analyses.
 Modified syntax of the dominance test and the inclusion of an efficiency defense clause, such that the analysis of the merger proposal is much closer to the U.S. method.
III. Data and methods

III.A. Sample description
We start with the sample used by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) , which includes all transactions submitted to the EC from 1990 to 2000. From the EC website, 10 we augment this database with merger notifications from 2001-2007, when the EC examined 2,145 proposed deals. Of these proposals, the EC authorized 1,924 (89.7%) outright, cleared 86 (4%) subject to remedies, and sent 81 (3.8%) to the in-depth investigation phase. The remaining 54 proposed deals either were withdrawn by the submitting parties before the EC decision or transferred by the EC to national authorities. Furthermore, of the 81 deals challenged by the EC, 27 were approved, 36 approved subject to conditions, 5 prohibited, and 13 withdrawn before the EC's final decision; 1 deal (Tetra Laval/Sidel) also was authorized subject to remedies after the Court of First Instance annulled the EC's initial decision to prohibit it.
For our analysis, we need information about the deal and firm characteristics, which we collected from the Securities Data Company Mergers and Acquisitions database (SDC). We identified 1,603 of the 2,145 cases examined by the EC, or 74.7% of the total sample, in SDC and included all the major deals submitted to the EC during the 2001-2007 period.
To compute wealth effects (i.e., abnormal returns) around the initial announcement of the merger proposal, we also require market data for both the acquirer and the target, and thus, the 2001-2007 period sample reduces to 192 deals. We use the CRSP and Datastream databases to collect market data. The availability of some control variables, such as deal value, further restricts the sample to 184 observations in our multivariate analyses. However, because some univariate analyses do not require both the acquirer and the target to be public, the sizes of the samples differ across tables; we report them in each case.
In particular, Table 1 The proportion of deals authorized outright is approximately 80%, the proportion approved after remedies represents 9.7% of the total sample, and 9.3% of the merger proposals lead to in-depth investigations. Across the two subperiods, the proportion of approval after remedies increased from 8.6% to 11.4%, whereas the proportion of in-depth investigations decreased from 10.3% to 7.6%. Regarding the home country of the acquirers, the proportion of deals with foreign acquirers increased substantially over time, from 35.9% for the first subperiod to 47.8% for the latter.
III.B. Industry rivals
To test the protectionism hypothesis, Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) identified the European industry rivals for each acquirer included in the sample. We rely mainly on the Thomson One Banker Comparables database (TOB) to identify these industry rivals, using the following criteria: The rival belongs to one of the first 15 countries that joined the European Union, 11 has the same ICB Subsector code 12 as the acquirer, and achieves sales relatively comparable to those of the acquirer. 13 When necessary, we complement the TOB database information with data from Hoover's Online database and decision reports provided by the EC.
For the 674 merger proposals with listed acquirers, we identified European rivals for 633 cases. On average, we found 9 European rivals per merger proposal between 2001 and 2007 (minimum = 1, maximum = 16).
III.C. Abnormal return estimation
Following Fama et al. (1969) , we use the event study method to isolate the impact of a particular event on market valuations. In a first step, we construct a model for normal returns and use the standard market model to estimate them:
where R jt is the observed return for firm j on day t; R Mt is the return of a concurrent local country stock market index on day t; α j and β j are, respectively, the estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) regression intercept and slope; and ε jt is the regression residual. 14 We then estimate the market model parameters using 200 daily observations during a period that ends 30 days before the initial announcement of the merger proposal. To compute the corresponding returns, the prices are kept in local currency. 15 The abnormal return (AR) for day t corresponds to the difference between the observed return on day t and that estimated using the market model:
To measure the wealth effect induced by a given merger proposal, we compute the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) by summing the daily AR over an 11-day interval, centered around the announcement day. To analyze the announcement effects at the deal level, we form a value-weighted portfolio of the merging parties, using the market value of the firms on the last day of the estimation window as the weight. With the same portfolio approach, we assess the impact of the merger proposal on the industry rival firms.
Finally, we assess the significance of the CAR, which requires tackling several econometric problems such as non-normality and event-induced variance. We follow the percentile-t bootstrap procedure advocated by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2004) , which not only is robust to non-normal and autocorrelated abnormal returns but also controls for eventinduced variance. 16 (2007), column 1). The average acquirer CAR is not significant at conventional levels in either subperiod, so acquirers break even on average in our sample. This result is largely consistent with prior literature focusing on acquisitions of listed targets (e.g., Jensen and Ruback (1983) ; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) ; Martynova and Renneboog (2008) ). 16 We computed the bootstrapped t-statistic using Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen's (1991) approach, which is robust to event-induced variance.
IV. Results
IV.A. Preliminary analysis
The average target CAR is 15.57% during 2001-2007 (column 2)-substantially higher than the average target CAR of 9.05% during the 1990s, as reported by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) . This difference between the two subperiods might be driven by a change in the proportion of deals with foreign acquirers, which has increased substantially over time ( For combined firms (acquirer plus target), Table 2 indicates significant wealth creation effects for shareholders around the announcement day. The average CAR at the deal level is 2.59% for merger proposals during 2001-2007, a result that is substantially higher than the 0.88% return reported by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) . The deal CARs in Table 2 also are largely consistent with prior findings (e.g., 3.51% in Mulherin and Boone (2000) ; 1.4% in Andrade, Gregor, and Stafford (2001) ).
For industry rivals, an announcement of a merger proposal is a bad news on average, but the corresponding CARs are only marginally significant. The effect on industry rivals appears statistically less significant during 2001-2007, with a p-value equal to 0.15. This result contrasts with previous U.S. studies that document significantly positive return for rivals (e.g., ; Song and Walkling (2000); Fee and Thomas (2004) The analysis of merging parties' and rivals' abnormal returns thus suggests that our sample deals are synergistic combinations, and most of the synergy gains accrue to target shareholders. These results are clearly incompatible with increased monopoly power at the industry level, which requires positive rival returns to be validated (see Eckbo (1983) ).
Next, Table 3 than deals that prompt in-depth investigations (4.43%). This finding largely corroborates the results obtained for EC decisions during the 1990s (column 1), though expected value creation is substantially greater in the more recent period. The larger CAR for deals subjected to in-depth investigations is compatible with the regulator's motive to combat monopoly power if value creation stems from an increase in monopoly rents.
A positive deal CAR also is compatible with a synergy-based explanation though. To disentangle these alternative hypotheses (e.g., synergy versus market power), Eckbo (1983) suggests including industry rivals in the analysis: Synergy-driven mergers should be bad news for rivals, but anticompetitive mergers likely benefit industry rivals (i.e., they enjoy the reduction in competition). For deals submitted during 2001-2007, European industry rivals earned negative abnormal returns on average (see Table 2 ), but this result is significant only for industry rivals of deals approved outright (CAR = -0.36%; p-value = 0.08). The initial positive deal CAR and negative rival CAR together suggest that merger proposals approved outright tend to be pro-competitive (or synergy-driven) transaction. In comparison with deals from 1990-2000, the most striking difference pertains to the in-depth investigation, for which industry rival CAR is no longer significant.
With The univariate results summarized in Table 3 may be misleading though, because potential latent factors might affect the observed correlations. We therefore adopt a multivariate analysis in the next section. Another significant issue affecting the interpretation of univariate results is that CAR reflects investor anticipations, which incorporate the forthcoming regulatory challenge (e.g., Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams (1990) ).
Announcement date abnormal returns reflect the product of the interaction of expected wealth effects with deal completion probability, both of which may be affected by regulatory challenges. Moreover, as emphasized by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2004) , regulators likely gauge market price movements in deciding whether to act, which reinforces the endogeneity of the relation between investor anticipations and regulator decisions. This endogenous relation between announcement date CAR and regulatory intervention must therefore be controlled for.
IV.B. Reexamination of the protectionism hypothesis
In this section we revisit the protectionism hypothesis test introduced by Aktas, de Bodt, and The test relies on a probit regression with bootstrapped statistical tests. The considered model has the following form:
where EC Intervention is the dependent variable, which takes the value of 1 in case of approval subject to remedies or in-depth investigation, and 0 in case of outright authorization.
X is a vector of explanatory variables (including a constant); β is a vector of coefficients; and is the normal cumulative density function.
To test the protectionism hypothesis, we consider the following variables of interest:
 Non-EU acquirer, a dummy variable that identifies foreign acquirers (i.e., firms not domiciled in one of the European Union countries). With this variable, we can determine whether European regulators are influenced by the acquirer's country of origin. There is however no reason why an acquirer's nationality should influence the regulator's inclination to intervene, provided that the regulator is motivated purely by a desire to enhance competition.
 Rival CAR, which measures the impact of a merger on European industry rivals. It corresponds to the 11-day market-adjusted abnormal returns of the rival portfolio.
Following Eckbo (1983) , because one of the aims of the regulators is to combat monopoly power, this variable is expected to have a positive effect on intervention probability.
 Non-EU acquirer × rival CAR, the product of the two preceding variables and the key variable for testing the protectionism hypothesis. Under the protectionism hypothesis, foreign acquirers are subject to more regulatory interventions than domestic ones when local rivals may be harmed. The interaction variable is therefore expected to have a negative impact on intervention probability.
The regression also includes the same set of control variables as in Aktas, de Bodt, and de Bodt (2007) , to guarantee the comparability of the results: deal CAR, target size, acquirer size, deal value, and an indicator of sector proximity (i.e., correlation coefficient of target and acquirer returns), as described in the Appendix. For the other explanatory variables, the comparison of columns 1 and 2 indicates that only deal value keeps its sign and significance across both periods (though the result is marginally significant in column 2, with a p-value of 0.11). Larger deals continue to attract closer scrutiny from regulators. Two other interesting explanatory variables, deal CAR and acquirer size, were not significant in column 1 but become significant in column 2. Deal CAR has a positive and significant coefficient (p-value = 0.04) in column 2, which suggests two possible interpretations. First, the regulators use market reactions to decide whether to act, or second, the potential of monopoly rents is determined independently by the regulators, but investors' assessments remain consistent with regulators' estimations. Acquirer size also positively affects the probability of intervention (p-value = 0.00), suggesting that takeovers initiated by large firms raise more anticompetitive issues. Consistent with Duso, Gugler, and
Szücs (2010), the comparison of the pseudo R-square between columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 indicates that the predictability of EC regulations has diminished over time.
The comparison of the results across the two periods also indicates that the EC changed its behavior over time. The lack of protectionism propensity in the more recent period and the statistical significance of variables such as deal CAR, acquirer size, and deal value suggest that the soundness of the EC decisions, from an economic point of view, has increased.
We thus try to determine when the EC started to change its behavior by considering three additional specifications in Duso, Gugler, and Szücs (2010) ). It is important to note that 2004 also corresponds to the last year in which Mario Monti served as commissioner in charge of competition policy. Monti was repeatedly identified as a tough commissioner by the financial press, so the change in EC behavior may relate as much to the change of commissioner as to the adoption of the new regulation.
Finally, column 5 of (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) ), we use the sample of firms with available market data that undertook an acquisition in 1990-2001. We assume that these firms are likely acquirers in the future and study market reactions for these firms around the announcement dates of the Court of First Instance judgments.
The results in Table 5 and found that the negative effect observed for non-EU firms was driven mainly by U.S. firms in the sample. Their average CAR was -2.16% and highly significant (p-value = 0.01). In contrast, the impact was not statistically significant for other foreign firms in the sample.
Third, the Airtours/First Choice prohibited merger involved two European firms, so the decision might have demonstrated the EC's willingness to apply the same criteria to all mergers. Following the Court of First Instance's decision to annul the prohibition, investors might have interpreted these actions as just another tactic to favor domestic firms in the European M&A market. Fourth, the use of past acquirers (from 1990-2001) may be too noisy an indicator to identify future acquirers.
Regarding the Schneider/Legrand judgment in Panel B of Table 5 , the announcement of the decision on October 22, 2002, was associated with a negative, significant CAR for EU acquirers and a marginally significant, positive impact for non-EU acquirers. The difference in means between EU and non-EU acquirers CAR also was statistically significant, consistent with our initial intuition that investors would anticipate the reduction in bias against foreign acquirers in the EC's merger policy.
No CAR is significant in Panel C, following the October 25, 2002, announcement of the court's judgment in the Tetra Laval/Sidel. The announcement dates of the latter two judgments were very close, so the third judgment likely had been anticipated already by market participants.
V.B. Endogeneity between investor reactions and regulatory interventions
To provide consistent results, the explanatory variable of interest in econometric analyses should be exogenous. In our model, market reactions to the deal announcement (i.e., abnormal returns) are likely endogenous to the probability of EC intervention. With the announcement of a merger proposal, investors anticipate potential value creation (or destruction) for the involved companies and their rivals. They also attempt to figure out whether regulatory actions will affect the merger. The EC regulators consider most probably the value creation around the deal announcement to assess the potential presence of monopoly rents. Therefore, the endogenous relationship between market reactions and regulatory decisions might affect the results in Table 4 .
To test the robustness of our results, we adopted a classical, two-step instrumental variable procedure (Greene (2008) ). In the first step, we regressed the endogenous variable on a set of genuine exogenous variables. Then, we used the fitted ordinary least square (OLS) values as instruments in the second-stage probit model.
We initially tried to build instruments for both deal CAR and rival CAR using the same first-step model as in Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) . However, the explanatory power of the first-stage regression for rival CAR was particularly weak (i.e., no regression coefficients significantly different from 0), especially in the recent period. 18 Because the deal CAR and rival CAR instruments featured several common variables, we also face a serious collinearity issue when we include both in the second-step specification. Therefore, we only report the results for instrumenting the deal CAR variable, using the same model as in Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) . Table 6 presents the first-stage OLS regression. The dependent variable is the 11-day deal CAR, and the independent variables are described in Appendix. The explanatory power of the model is better for the recent period, with an R-square of 22% (see column 2) compared with an R-square of only 4% for the 1990-2000 period. It is also worth mentioning that the Fisher test rejects the null hypothesis that all coefficients are 0.
In the second step, we reestimated the specifications in Table 4 , using the instrumental variable obtained in the first-stage OLS, and report these results in Table 4 receive support from the two-stage procedure. Of the control variables, deal value and rival CAR also retain their sign and significance in the twostep approach.
VI. Conclusion
This article revisits the protectionism hypothesis related to the European merger regulation (EMR). Following the criticisms of the EC near the end of the 1990s regarding the soundness of its economic analysis, the EC initiated a reform process that led to significant modifications of the regulation in 2004. Using the approach introduced by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007), we test whether evidence of protectionism in the 1990s has persisted to more recent periods.
Our event study reveals that initial announcement effects are positive at the deal level and negative for industry rivals. That is, mergers submitted to the EC on average are procompetitive. This evidence is incompatible with the market power hypothesis. Our results also
show that the expected value creation anticipated with the initial announcement depends on the EC's subsequent decision. Specifically, average CAR correlates positively with the depth of the EC's investigations.
Furthermore, we find that the protectionism exhibited by the EC in the 1990s is not observable anymore. In particular, the intensity of EC scrutiny does not depend on acquirer nationality or the impact of the initial announcement on European rivals. The three 2002 judgments by the Court of First Instance that overturned important EC decisions might have triggered the EMR reform process, though we find little support for this intuition.
In conclusion, another important channel for implementing protectionist policies in the European M&A market moves through the actions of European member states (see Dinç and Erel (2011) ). The disappearance of protectionist behavior at the EC level during [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] could reflect a transfer of such efforts and attitudes to member states. Therefore, the study of the interplay between actions by member states and decisions by the EC in the context of the M&A market offers an interesting avenue for further research.
Appendix: Variable definitions
Variable Description
Deal CAR The 11-day market-adjusted abnormal returns at the announcement date for the deal. For each deal, we form a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and target abnormal returns, using the market value of the firms on the last day of the estimation period as the weight.
Target size
The market value of the target, evaluated at the end of the estimation period, in millions of dollars.
Acquirer size
The market value of the acquirer, evaluated at the end of the estimation period, in millions of dollars.
Acquirer/target correlation The correlation coefficient of acquirer and target returns during the estimation period (indicator of sector proximity).
Deal value
The value of the deal in millions of dollars.
Non-EU acquirer A dummy variable equal to 1.0 if the home country of the acquirer is not one of the European Union countries.
Rival CAR
The 11-day market-adjusted abnormal returns at the announcement date for the portfolio of European rivals. For each deal, we form a valueweighted portfolio of industry rivals abnormal returns, using the market value of the firms on the last day of the estimation period as the weight.
Non-EU acquirer × rival CAR The product of the two preceding variables. Table 4 Determinants of the probability of EC intervention This table presents the results of a standard probit regression. The dependent variable is equal to 0 if the European Commission (EC) approves a merger proposal outright. It takes a value of 1 in the case of approval subject to remedies or in-depth investigation. The independent variables are described in the Appendix. Estimation is by maximum likelihood. The LR statistic provides a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that all independent variables are jointly insignificant. P-values, in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates, are obtained by a percentile-t bootstrap procedure, using 1,000 replications, as described by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) . The results in column 1 are based on the sample from Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007 Table 7 Determinants of the probability of EC intervention: Two-stage instrumental variable probit This table presents the results of the two-stage instrumental variable probit regression. The dependent variable is equal to 0 if the European Commission (EC) approves a merger proposal outright. It takes a value of 1 in the case of approval subject to remedies or an in-depth investigation. The independent variables are described in the Appendix. Estimation is by maximum likelihood. The LR statistic provides a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that all independent variables are jointly insignificant. P-values, in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates, are obtained by a percentile-t bootstrap procedure, using 2,500 replications, as described by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007 
